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CBO
Estimated Impact of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from 
October 2011 Through December 2011
In February 2009, in response to significant weakness 
in the economy, lawmakers enacted the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The legislation’s 
numerous spending and revenue provisions can be 
grouped into several categories according to their focus
 Providing funds to states and localities—for example, 
by raising federal matching rates under Medicaid, 
providing aid for education, and increasing financial 
support for some transportation projects;
 Supporting people in need—such as by extending and 
expanding unemployment benefits and increasing 
benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (formerly the Food Stamp program);
 Purchasing goods and services—for instance, by fund-
ing construction and other investment activities that 
could take several years to complete; and
 Providing temporary tax relief for individuals and 
businesses—such as by raising exemption amounts for 
the alternative minimum tax, adding a new Making 
Work Pay tax credit, and creating enhanced deduc-
tions for depreciation of business equipment.
When ARRA was being considered, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimated that it would increase budget 
deficits by $787 billion between fiscal years 2009 and 
2019. CBO now estimates that the total impact over the 
2009–2019 period will amount to about $831 billion. By 
CBO’s estimate, close to half of that impact occurred in 
fiscal year 2010, and more than 90 percent of ARRA’s 
budgetary impact was realized by the end of December 
2011.
Various recipients of ARRA funds (most recipients of 
grants and loans, contractors, and subcontractors) are 
required to report, after the end of each calendar quarter, 
the number of jobs funded through ARRA. The law also 
requires CBO to comment on those reported numbers.1
During the fourth quarter of calendar year 2011, 
recipients reported, ARRA funded more than 200,000 
full-time-equivalent (FTE) jobs.2 Those reports, however, 
do not provide a comprehensive estimate of the law’s 
impact on U.S. employment, which could be higher or 
lower than the number of FTE jobs reported, for several 
reasons (in addition to any issues concerning the quality 
of the reports’ data).3 First, some of the jobs included in 
1. Public Law 111-5, sections 1512(c) and 1512(e); 123 Stat. 115, 
288. This report is the 10th in CBO’s series of quarterly reports. 
For the previous report, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
on Employment and Economic Output from July 2011 Through 
September 2011 (November 2011). 
2. Data compiled from recipients’ reports (on jobs funded and other 
information) are shown at www.recovery.gov. Recipients were 
asked to calculate FTEs by taking the total number of hours 
worked in a quarter that were funded by ARRA and dividing the 
total by the number of hours that a full-time employee would 
have worked in that quarter.
3. For a discussion of data quality, see Government Accountability 
Office, Recovery Act: Opportunities to Improve Management and 
Strengthen Accountability over States’ and Localities’ Uses of Funds, 
GAO-10-999 (September 2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10999.pdf. 
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the reports might have existed even without the stimulus 
package, with employees working on the same activities 
or other activities. Second, the reports cover employers 
that received ARRA funding directly and those employ-
ers’ immediate subcontractors (the so-called primary 
and secondary recipients of ARRA funding) but not 
lower-level subcontractors. Third, the reports do not 
attempt to measure the number of jobs that were created 
or retained indirectly as a result of recipients’ increased 
income, and the increased income of their employees, 
which could boost demand for other products and ser-
vices as they spent their paychecks. Fourth, the recipients’ 
reports cover only certain ARRA appropriations, which 
encompass about one-fifth of the total either spent by 
the government or conveyed through tax reductions in 
ARRA; the reports do not measure the effects of other 
provisions of the stimulus package, such as tax cuts and 
transfer payments (including unemployment insurance 
payments) to individual people. 
Estimating the law’s overall effects on employment 
requires a more comprehensive analysis than can be 
achieved by using the recipients’ reports. Therefore, look-
ing at recorded spending to date along with estimates of 
the other effects of ARRA on spending and revenues, 
CBO has estimated the law’s impact on employment 
and economic output using evidence about the effects 
of previous similar policies and drawing on various 
mathematical models that represent the workings of the 
economy. On that basis, and as summarized in Table 1, 
CBO estimates that ARRA’s policies had the following 
effects in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2011 com-
pared with what would have occurred otherwise:
 They raised real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic 
product (GDP) by between 0.2 percent and 
1.5 percent, 
 They lowered the unemployment rate by between 
0.2 percentage points and 1.1 percentage points,
 They increased the number of people employed by 
between 0.3 million and 2.0 million, and
 They increased the number of full-time-equivalent 
jobs by 0.4 million to 2.6 million. (Increases in FTE 
jobs include shifts from part-time to full-time work or 
overtime and are thus generally larger than increases in 
the number of employed workers.) 
The effects of ARRA on output peaked in the first half 
of 2010 and have since diminished, CBO estimates. 
The effects of ARRA on employment are estimated to lag 
slightly behind the effects on output; CBO estimates that 
the employment effects began to wane at the end of 2010 
and continued to do so throughout 2011. Still, CBO esti-
mates that, compared with what would have occurred 
otherwise, ARRA will raise real GDP in 2012 by between 
0.1 percent and 0.8 percent and will increase the number 
of people employed in 2012 by between 0.2 million and 
1.1 million. 
CBO’s current estimates of the economic effects of ARRA 
for 2009 through 2012 are unchanged from its estimates 
published in November 2011.4 However, CBO’s current 
estimates of the economic effects of ARRA in 2013 are 
slightly larger than its previous estimates because CBO 
now anticipates that short-term interest rates will remain 
very low for longer than the agency previously projected. 
In particular, CBO now expects that, under current law, 
short-term interest rates will stay close to zero through 
2013 and rise only slightly in 2014. The path of short-
term interest rates affects the economic impact of ARRA 
because an increase in rates resulting from the economic 
boost provided by the fiscal stimulus discourages some 
spending on business investment and durable goods. 
Although CBO has examined data on output and 
employment during the period since ARRA’s enactment, 
those data are not as helpful in determining ARRA’s eco-
nomic effects as might be supposed because isolating the 
effects would require knowing what path the economy 
would have taken in the absence of the law. Because that 
path cannot be observed, the new data add only limited 
information about ARRA’s impact. 
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Recipients’ Reports
ARRA requires primary and secondary recipients of more 
than $25,000 from appropriations made under the law 
to report a variety of information each calendar quarter. 
That group includes most grant and loan recipients, con-
tractors, and subcontractors, but it excludes individual 
4. See Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Impact of the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic 
Output from July 2011 Through September 2011 (November 
2011). 
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Table 1.
Estimated Macroeconomic Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, 2009 to 2013
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: * = between -0.05 and 0.05.
a. A year of full-time-equivalent employment is 40 hours of employment per week for one year.
Q1 * 0.1 * * * * * 0.1
Q2 0.4 1.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7
Q3 0.6 2.4 -0.2 -0.6 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.7
Q4 0.7 3.4 -0.3 -1.1 0.5 1.9 0.7 2.8
Q1 0.9 4.3 -0.3 -1.5 0.6 2.7 0.9 4.0
Q2 0.8 4.6 -0.4 -1.8 0.7 3.4 1.0 4.8
Q3 0.7 4.1 -0.4 -2.0 0.7 3.6 1.0 5.1
Q4 0.6 3.5 -0.3 -1.9 0.6 3.5 0.9 4.9
Q1 0.6 3.2 -0.3 -1.8 0.6 3.3 0.8 4.6
Q2 0.4 2.5 -0.3 -1.6 0.5 2.9 0.7 3.9
Q3 0.3 2.0 -0.2 -1.3 0.4 2.4 0.5 3.2
Q4 0.2 1.5 -0.2 -1.1 0.3 2.0 0.4 2.6
Q1 0.2 1.1 -0.1 -0.8 0.2 1.5 0.3 1.9
Q2 0.1 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.4
Q3 0.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 1.0 0.2 1.0
Q4 0.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.7
Q1 0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5
Q2 0.1 0.4 * -0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4
Q3 0.1 0.3 * -0.2 0.1 0.4 * 0.2
Q4 * 0.3 * -0.2 0.1 0.4 * 0.1
0.4 1.8 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3 1.3
0.7 4.1 -0.4 -1.8 0.7 3.3 0.9 4.7
0.4 2.3 -0.2 -1.4 0.4 2.6 0.6 3.6
0.1 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 1.1 0.2 1.3
0.1 0.4 * -0.3 0.1 0.5 * 0.3
Product (Percent) (Percentage points) (Millions of people)  Employment (Millions)a
Real Gross Domestic Unemployment Rate Employment Full-Time-Equivalent
Estimate Estimate
Low High Low High Low High
Calendar Year Average
Change Attributable to ARRA
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Calendar Year Quarters
Low High
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
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people. The information to be submitted includes 
the amount of funding received and spent; the name, 
description, and completion status of the project or 
activity funded; the number of jobs funded; and, for 
investments in infrastructure, the purpose and cost of the 
investment. Recipients who filed fourth-quarter reports 
in January 2012 reported the number of jobs on the basis 
of the number of employee hours paid for with ARRA 
funds in the quarter.5
According to those reports, 213,094 full-time-equivalent 
jobs were funded by ARRA during the fourth quarter.6 
However, the reported number of jobs funded is not a 
comprehensive measure of ARRA’s effect on overall 
employment or even of those provisions of ARRA for 
which recipients’ reports are required. The actual impact 
could, in principle, be significantly larger or smaller than 
the number of jobs reported. 
If, for example, recipients’ reports include employment 
that would have occurred without ARRA, the impact on 
employment suggested by the reports could be too great. 
Some people whose employment was attributed to ARRA 
might have worked on other activities in the absence of 
the law—for example, a business might have bid on 
other projects if its resources had not been committed to 
projects funded by ARRA. In the case of government 
employees, state or local taxes might have been raised in 
the absence of ARRA funding (or transfer payments 
might have been reduced) to pay for some of the jobs that 
were counted as funded by ARRA. 
Conversely, the reported figure could be too low because 
the reporting requirement is limited to primary and 
secondary recipients of funds and thus excludes lower-
level recipients, such as subcontractors hired by a main 
subcontractor. Thus, if expenditures under ARRA led 
to increases in employment among lower-level 
subcontractors and vendors, those effects would be 
missed by the reports. 
Recipients’ reports also do not include indirect effects 
that could increase or decrease the impact on employ-
ment. Among those effects are potential declines in 
employment in other businesses or economic sectors as 
demand shifts toward the recipients of ARRA funding—
a phenomenon often called the “crowding out” effect 
of government policies. Conversely, spending under 
ARRA could lead to higher employment at companies 
that are not directly connected to that spending—for 
example, because of additional purchases made by people 
who would be unemployed were it not for ARRA funds. 
CBO estimates that, under current conditions, the indi-
rect effects, on net, would tend to reinforce the direct 
effects for most of the range of their estimated magnitude.
Finally, the recipients’ reports reflect only about one-fifth 
of the total amount of spending increases or tax reduc-
tions that are attributable to ARRA’s provisions. The 
reports cover direct government purchases of goods and 
services, grants and loans to private entities, and some 
grants to states and localities, but they do not cover tax 
cuts or increases in transfer payments to individuals. 
The tax reductions and spending that are not covered by 
the recipients’ reports probably had substantial effects on 
purchases of goods and services and, therefore, on 
employment.
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Economic Models and Historical Data
CBO used various economic models and historical 
data to guide its estimate of the way in which output 
and employment are affected by increases in outlays 
and reductions in revenues under ARRA. CBO’s assess-
ment is that different elements of ARRA (such as particu-
lar types of tax cuts, transfer payments, and government 
purchases) have had different effects on economic output 
per dollar of higher spending or lower tax receipts. Multi-
plying estimates of those per-dollar effects by the dollar 
amounts of each element of ARRA yields an estimate of 
the law’s total impact on output. To produce estimates 
of ARRA’s total impact on employment, CBO combined 
that estimate with estimates of how changes in output 
affect the unemployment rate and participation in the 
labor force.
5. Specifically, recipients were instructed to calculate the number 
of FTE jobs funded through ARRA by counting the total number 
of hours worked that were funded by ARRA during the fourth 
quarter, divided by the number of hours in a full-time schedule for 
a quarter. For details and examples, see Office of Management and 
Budget, “Recovery FAQs for Federal Contractors on Reporting,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/recovery_faqs_contractors/#report15.
6. For the number of jobs by agency, see “Top Agencies, as 
Reported by Recipients (Oct 1–Dec 31, 2011),” www.
recovery.gov/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=jobSummary-
Agency&topnumber=200&qtr=2011Q4.
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CBO’s Modeling Approach
CBO used evidence from models and historical relation-
ships to determine estimated “multipliers” for each of sev-
eral categories of spending and tax provisions in ARRA, 
as shown in Table 2. Each multiplier represents the esti-
mated direct and indirect effects on the nation’s output of 
a dollar’s worth of a given policy. Therefore, a provision’s 
multiplier can be applied to the budgetary cost of that 
provision to estimate its overall impact on output. 
Direct effects consist of immediate (or first-round) effects 
on economic activity. Government purchases of goods 
and services directly add to the nation’s output, dollar 
for dollar. For reductions in taxes, increases in transfer 
payments, and increases in aid to state and local govern-
ments, the size of the direct effect depends on the policy’s 
impact on the behavior of recipients. If someone receives 
a dollar in transfer payments and spends 80 cents (saving 
the other 20 cents), production increases over time to 
meet the additional demand generated by that spending, 
and the direct impact on output is 80 cents. Similarly, if a 
dollar in aid to a state government leads that government 
to spend 50 cents more on employees’ salaries (but causes 
no other changes in state spending or revenues, with the 
other 50 cents used to reduce borrowing or build up 
rainy-day funds), the direct impact on output is 50 cents.
CBO reviewed evidence on the responses of households, 
businesses, and governments to various types of tax cuts 
and transfer payments to estimate the size of those poli-
cies’ direct effects on output.7 For example:
 A one-time cash payment is likely to have less impact 
on a household’s purchases than is a longer-lasting 
change to disposable income because the one-time 
payment has a smaller effect on total lifetime dispos-
able income. 
 Increases in disposable income are likely to boost pur-
chases more for lower-income than for higher-income 
households. That difference arises, at least in part, 
because a larger share of people in lower-income 
households cannot borrow as much money as they 
would wish in order to spend more than they do 
currently. 
 Changes to corporate taxes that primarily affect after-
tax profits on past investment generally have a smaller 
impact on output than do policies that alter the return 
from new investment. 
Government policies also can have indirect effects that 
enhance or offset the direct effects. Direct effects are 
enhanced when, for example, a government policy creates 
jobs and those who are hired use their income to 
boost consumption. Direct effects also are enhanced 
when greater demand for goods and services prompts 
companies to increase investment to bolster their future 
production. 
In the other direction, substantial government spending 
can cause a shift in resources (including employees) 
away from production in other businesses and sectors to 
government-funded projects. That indirect crowding-out 
effect could cause growth in employment among recipi-
ents of ARRA funding to be offset by declines in employ-
ment elsewhere in the economy. Increases in interest rates 
are one possible mechanism for such crowding out: 
Higher interest rates discourage spending on investment 
and on durable goods such as cars because they raise the 
cost of borrowing. However, because the Federal Reserve 
has kept short-term interest rates very low, that mecha-
nism does not appear to have been an important factor 
through the fourth quarter of 2011. By another mecha-
nism for crowding out, activities funded by ARRA could 
reduce production elsewhere in the economy if they used 
scarce materials or workers with specific skills, creating 
bottlenecks that hindered other activities. That effect, 
too, was probably much smaller in the past two and a half 
years than it might have been otherwise because of high 
unemployment and a large amount of unused resources 
(as well as the diversity of activities funded under ARRA). 
In estimating the magnitude of indirect effects, CBO 
relied heavily on estimates from macroeconometric 
7. On household spending, for example, see Jonathan A. Parker 
and others, Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus 
Payments of 2008, Working Paper 16684 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2011); Matthew 
D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, “Did the 2008 Tax Rebates Stimu-
late Spending?” American Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 
2009), pp. 374–379; Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas 
S. Souleles, “The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to 
Tax Rebates: Evidence from Consumer Credit Data,” Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 6 (December 2007), pp. 986–
1019; and David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. 
Souleles, “Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates 
of 2001,” American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 5 (December 
2006), pp. 1589–1610.
6 ESTIMATED IMPACT OF ARRA ON EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT FROM OCTOBER 2011 THROUGH DECEMBER 2011
CBO
Table 2.
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
Continued
forecasting models, informed by evidence from other 
types of models, direct estimation using historical data, 
and ongoing review of relevant research. (Those sources 
of information are discussed in the appendix.)
CBO grouped the provisions of ARRA into general cate-
gories and assigned high and low multipliers to each. The 
ranges for those multipliers were chosen judgmentally to 
encompass most economists’ views about the direct 
and indirect effects of different policies. The multipliers 
indicate the cumulative impact of policies on GDP over 
several quarters, and they should be understood to apply 
to periods when the Federal Reserve is holding short-term 
interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus, 
as has been the case over the past two years. For instance, 
CBO estimates that a one-time increase of $1 in federal 
purchases of goods and services in one calendar quarter 
last year raised GDP above what it would have been 
otherwise by a total of 50 cents to $2.50 over several 
quarters. That cumulative multiplier of $2.50 at the high 
end of the range comprises increases in GDP of roughly 
$1.45 in the quarter when the federal spending occurred, 
roughly 60 cents in the following quarter, and roughly 
45 cents in later quarters combined. By the end of 2016, 
when monetary policy is assumed to be fully responsive to 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Purchases of Goods and Services 0.5 2.5 Division A, Title II: Other; Title IV: Energy Efficiency and
by the Federal Government Renewable Energy; Title IV: Innovative Technology Loan
Guarantee Program; Title IV: Other Energy Programs; Title V: 
Federal Buildings Fund; Title VIII: National Institutes of Health;
Title VIII: Other Department of Health and Human Services
Transfer Payments to State and 0.4 2.2 Division A, Title VII: Clean Water and Drinking Water State 
Local Governments for Revolving Funds; Title XI: Other Housing Assistance; Title XII: 
Infrastructure Highway Construction; Title XII: Other Transportation 
Transfer Payments to State and 0.4 1.8 Division A, Title VIII: Education for the Disadvantaged; Title 
Local Governments for Other VIII: Special Education; Title IX: State Fiscal Stabilization Fund; 
Purposes Division B, Title V: State Fiscal Relief Fund
Transfer Payments to Individuals 0.4 2.1 Division A, Title I: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; 
Title VIII: Student Financial Assistance; Division B, Title I: 
Refundable Tax Credits; Title II: Unemployment 
Compensation; Title III: Health Insurance Assistanceb
One-Time Payments to Retirees 0.2 1.0 Division B, Title II: Economic Recovery Payments
Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- 0.3 1.5 Division B, Title I: Making Work Pay Credit;
and Middle-Income People American Opportunity Tax Credit
One-Year Tax Cut for Higher- 0.1 0.6 Increase in Individual AMT Exemption Amount
Income People
Extension of First-Time 0.2 0.8 Extension of First-Time Homebuyer Credit
Homebuyer Credit
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
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Table 2. Continued
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Notes: Provisions affecting outlays (including refundable tax provisions) are identified by the same names used by CBO in its cost estimate for 
the conference agreement for H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (February 13, 2009). Provisions affecting 
revenues—all of which are included in title I of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)—are identified by the 
names used in the Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT’s) estimate (see www.house.gov/jct/x-19-09.pdf). 
Some provisions include individual elements that have different multipliers, by CBO’s estimate; in those cases, the provisions are listed 
with the multiplier used for the majority of the 2009–2019 budgetary cost.
The economic impact of three tax provisions with budgetary costs over $5 billion was analyzed using a different methodology, and 
their effects cannot easily be summarized by a multiplier. Those provisions were titled “Extend by Three Years the Placed-in-Service 
Date for Each Section 45 Qualified Facility” and “One-Year Extension of Special Allowance for Certain Property Acquired During 2009” 
in JCT’s estimate and “Health Information Technology” in CBO’s estimate. Some other provisions, with total budgetary costs of less 
than $7 billion, were included in the analysis but are not shown in the table.
AMT = alternative minimum tax.
a. The output multiplier is the cumulative impact of spending under the provisions on gross domestic product over several quarters. The 
ranges shown in the table assume that the Federal Reserve is holding short-term interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus.
b. This provision is a reduction in taxes, but it is treated as having the same economic impact as transfer payments to individuals.
fiscal stimulus, the estimated cumulative multipliers 
would be reduced by two-thirds.
The multipliers are applied to outlays when they occur 
and to changes in taxes or transfer payments when they 
affect disposable income. CBO’s estimates, therefore, 
account for the different rates of spending for various 
types of appropriations and, similarly, for the timing of 
different tax cuts or transfer payments. In some cases, 
when different elements of a single provision were esti-
mated to have different multipliers, the total cost of a 
provision was divided among more than one category. 
In those cases, the provision is shown in Table 2 in the 
category to which most of its budgetary cost applied. 
Provisions that affect outlays (including refundable tax 
credits) are identified by the same names used in CBO’s 
cost estimate for the conference agreement on ARRA.8 
Provisions that affect revenues are identified by the names 
used in the revenue estimate prepared by the staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation for the same legislation.9
The estimates of ARRA’s effects on output were trans-
lated into estimates of the effects on the unemployment 
rate, total employment, and FTE employment in a series 
of steps. First, the impact on the output gap—the per-
centage difference between actual and potential output—
was calculated.10 Next, the effect of the change in the out-
put gap on the unemployment rate was estimated using 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Corporate Tax Provisions 0 0.4 Deferral and Ratable Inclusion of Income Arising from Business 
Primarily Affecting Cash Flow Indebtedness Discharged by the Reacquisition of a Debt 
Instrument; Clarification of Regulations Related to Limitations 
on Certain Built-In Losses Following an Ownership Change; 
Recovery Zone Bonds; Qualified School Construction Bonds 
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
8. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for the conference 
agreement for H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (February 13, 2009).
9. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of 
the Revenue Provisions Contained in the Conference Agreement for 
H.R. 1, JCX-19-09 (February 12, 2009), www.jct.gov/x-19-
09.pdf. 
10. Potential output is the level of production that corresponds to a 
high rate of use of labor and capital. 
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the historical relationship between those two measures.11 
Then, the effect of changes in the unemployment rate on 
the labor force was taken into account: If unemployment 
declines and the economic environment improves, dis-
couraged workers and people who have chosen to pursue 
activities such as education rather than work will tend to 
return to the labor force. Together, the estimated effect 
on the unemployment rate and the effect on the labor 
force were used to estimate the impact on the number of 
people employed. The change in FTE employment was 
then estimated using the historical relationship between 
changes in hours per employed worker and changes in the 
gap between the unemployment rate and CBO’s estimate 
of the natural rate of unemployment.12 Because higher 
spending and lower taxes can affect output and unem-
ployment for some time after they occur, the impact of 
ARRA on employment in the fourth quarter of 2011 
depended partly on the law’s effect on spending and 
revenues in previous years.
A key advantage of the model-based approach used in 
this analysis is the ability to provide estimates of the total 
effects throughout the economy of the government 
spending, transfer payments, and tax cuts resulting from 
ARRA. By focusing on the net change in employment, 
that approach captures both the jobs created and the jobs 
retained as a result of ARRA.
A key disadvantage of the model-based approach is the 
considerable uncertainty about many of the economic 
relationships that are important in the modeling. Because 
economists differ on which analytical approaches provide 
the most convincing evidence about such relationships, 
they can reach different conclusions about those relation-
ships. In addition, each study involves uncertainty about 
the extent to which the results reflect the true effects of 
a given policy or the effects of other factors. For those 
reasons, CBO provides ranges of estimates of ARRA’s 
economic effects that are intended to encompass most 
economists’ views and thereby reflect the uncertainty 
involved in such estimates.
Changes from CBO’s Previous Estimates of the 
Impact of ARRA 
CBO’s current estimates of the economic effects of ARRA 
for 2009 through 2012 are unchanged from its estimates 
published in November 2011. However, the estimated 
economic effects of ARRA in 2013 are currently slightly 
larger than CBO previously estimated because the agency 
now projects that short-term interest rates will remain 
very low for longer than the agency previously projected. 
In November 2011, CBO had expected that short-term 
interest rates would start rising slightly at the end of 
2013, but under its current macroeconomic forecast, 
short-term interest rates are projected to stay close to zero 
through 2013 and rise only slightly in 2014.13 In particu-
lar, CBO now estimates that interest rates will not rise in 
2013 in response to ARRA’s effect on the economy. 
Those lower rates diminish the small degree of crowding 
out of economic activity that would have occurred in 
2013 and therefore slightly boost the estimated effects of 
ARRA in that year. 
ARRA’s Long-Run Effects 
In contrast to its positive near-term macroeconomic 
effects, ARRA will reduce output slightly in the long run, 
CBO estimates—by between zero and 0.2 percent after 
2016. But CBO expects that the legislation will have no 
long-term effects on employment because the U.S. econ-
omy will have a high rate of use of its labor resources in 
the long run.14 
ARRA’s long-run impact on the economy stems primarily 
from the resulting increase in government debt.15 To the 
extent that people hold their wealth in government secu-
rities rather than in a form that can be used to finance 
11. Changes in the output gap affect unemployment gradually over 
several quarters. Initially, part of a rise in output shows up as 
higher productivity and hours per worker rather than as reduced 
unemployment.
12. The natural rate of unemployment is the rate that arises from all 
sources except cyclical fluctuations in economywide demand for 
goods and services.
13. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022 (January 2012).
14. The reduction in GDP is therefore estimated to be reflected in 
lower wages rather than less employment, as workers will be 
slightly less productive because the capital stock will be slightly 
smaller. See Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable 
Judd Gregg concerning the estimated macroeconomic impacts of 
H.R. 1 as passed by the House and the Senate (February 11, 
2009).
15. For a discussion of the long-run effects of other debt-financed 
policies for boosting output and employment, see statement of 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, 
before the Senate Committee on the Budget, Policies for Increasing 
Economic Growth and Employment in 2012 and 2013 
(November 15, 2011).
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private investment, the increased debt tends to reduce the 
stock of productive private capital. In the long run, each 
dollar of additional debt crowds out about a third of a 
dollar’s worth of private domestic capital, CBO estimates. 
(The remainder of the rise in debt is offset by increases in 
private saving and inflows of foreign capital.) Because of 
uncertainty about the degree of crowding out, however, 
CBO’s range of estimates of ARRA’s long-run effects 
reflects the possibility that the extent of crowding out 
could be more or less than one-third of the added debt.
Over the long term, the output of the economy depends 
on the stock of productive capital, the supply of labor, 
and productivity. The less productive capital there is as 
a result of lower private investment, the smaller will be 
the nation’s output over the long run.
The effect of the crowding out of some private invest-
ment under ARRA will be offset somewhat by other 
factors. Some of ARRA’s provisions, including its funding 
for roads and highways, may add to the economy’s poten-
tial output in much the same way that private capital 
investment does. Others, including its funding of educa-
tion, may raise long-term productivity by enhancing 
people’s skills. Still other provisions create incentives for 
increased private investment. According to CBO’s esti-
mates, the provisions that potentially add to long-term 
output account for between one-fifth and one-quarter of 
ARRA’s budgetary cost. 
ARRA’s long-run effect on output also depends on 
whether it permanently changed people’s saving or their 
ability or willingness to work. For example, to the extent 
that ARRA reduced long-term unemployment during the 
2009–2011 period, it might improve participation in 
the labor force, employment, and productivity in later 
years. However, CBO’s estimates of the long-term effects 
of ARRA do not incorporate any effects of that sort.
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Appendix: 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of Fiscal Stimulus
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) based 
its estimates of the economic effects of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) on 
information from various sources—macroeconometric 
forecasting models, general-equilibrium models, and 
direct extrapolations from historical data. Macroecono-
metric forecasting models incorporate relationships 
among aggregate economic variables that are based largely 
on historical evidence. General-equilibrium models, by 
contrast, are built on explicit assumptions about the deci-
sionmaking of individual people and businesses. Direct 
extrapolations of historical data are generally based on 
correlations among economic variables in the past or on 
the effects of specific types of policy events in the past.1
Macroeconometric Forecasting Models
In analyzing ARRA’s economic effects, CBO drew heavily 
on versions of the commercial forecasting models of two 
economic consulting firms, Macroeconomic Advisors and 
Global Insight, and on the FRB-US model used at the 
Federal Reserve Board. Those models incorporate the 
assumption that the economy has an underlying potential 
output determined by the size of the labor supply, the 
capital stock, and technology. They also reflect the 
assumption that actual output can change relative to 
potential output because of shifts in aggregate demand 
for goods and services from households, businesses, and 
the government. With those basic assumptions, the 
details of interactions among economic variables in the 
models are based largely on historical relationships, 
informed by theories of how those variables are deter-
mined (for example, the theory that total consumption 
depends mostly on disposable income, wealth, and inter-
est rates).2 Because they emphasize the influence of 
aggregate demand on output in the short run, the macro-
econometric forecasting models tend to predict greater 
economic effects from demand-enhancing policies such 
as ARRA than some other types of models do.
Macroeconometric forecasting models of this sort are 
used widely, and they underlie most of the forecasts 
offered to the clients of economic consulting firms. In 
addition, the models that CBO uses generally produce 
results that are roughly in line with the consensus of 
private-sector forecasters, as compiled in the Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators. However, some analysts criticize this 
sort of model for being based on historical relationships 
among aggregate economic variables, such as income and 
consumption, rather than being built up from clearly 
specified rules governing the behavior of households and 
businesses. In particular, some critics argue that models 
based on historical relationships will not provide accurate 
predictions in the face of new policies or new circum-
stances. Partly to address that concern, CBO presents a 
range of possible effects rather than a single number for 
each economic variable.
To reflect current economic conditions—in which there 
is considerable uncertainty about the financial and eco-
nomic outlook and in which short-term interest rates are 
low and are expected to remain so for some time—CBO 
altered the models’ usual formulation to reduce the extent 
to which interest rates respond to increases in output.3 
Under more normal economic conditions, higher interest 
rates would offset roughly two-thirds of the cumulative 
impact of stimulative policies on gross domestic product 
over two years.4 
General-Equilibrium Models 
Some analysts prefer to use an alternative class of models, 
which tend to imply more modest economic effects 
from such policies. In those models, people are assumed 
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to make decisions about how much to work, buy, and 
save on the basis of current and expected future values 
of the wage rate, interest rates, taxes, and government 
purchases, among other things. In the basic form of 
such models, stimulative policies tend to crowd out a 
significant amount of other economic activity, and the 
indirect multipliers implied by those models tend to be 
less than one—meaning that such policies have less than 
a dollar-for-dollar impact on output. (Each such multi-
plier represents the estimated indirect effects on the 
nation’s output of a dollar’s worth of spending induced 
by a given policy.)
However, for several reasons, other analysts view this 
class of models as not well-suited to analyze the effects 
of countercyclical fiscal policy. In particular, this class of 
models does not typically incorporate involuntary unem-
ployment: In such models, people can work as many 
hours as they choose at the wage rate determined by the 
market. In addition, this type of model is generally predi-
cated on the assumption that people are fully rational and 
forward-looking, basing their current decisions on a full 
lifetime plan. The extreme version of the forward-looking 
assumption implies that people expect eventually to 
pay for any increased government spending or reduced 
revenues in the form of tax increases and that they incor-
porate those expected payments—even if beyond their 
own lifetimes—into their current spending plans. Thus, 
they are assumed to curtail their consumption when gov-
ernment spending rises because their lifetime income and 
that of their heirs has fallen by the amount of the even-
tual taxes. For the same reason, in such models, cash 
transfer payments and tax refunds have little or no effect 
on current consumption. People also are generally 
assumed to have full access to credit markets, so they 
can borrow to maintain consumption in the face of a 
temporary loss of income. Finally, in these models, mone-
tary policy often follows the rule that increased output 
or inflation implies higher inflation-adjusted interest 
rates, an assumption that does not correspond to current 
conditions, in which interest rates are low and expected 
to remain so for some time. 
Recent research has shown that relaxing some of those 
modeling assumptions can result in much higher multi-
pliers.5 CBO has incorporated the results of that research 
into its view of the effects of government policies. How-
ever, the research results appear to be too dependent on 
particular assumptions for CBO to rely on them heavily.
Extrapolations from Historical Data 
Another type of research uses historical data to directly 
project how government policies will affect the economy 
on the basis of how economic variables such as output 
and consumption have behaved in the past relative to 
government spending and revenues. However, estimates 
of economic effects from this research vary widely and are 
sensitive to the period and estimation strategy used.6 
Many estimates of this sort suggest that crowding-out 
effects dominate in the case of government purchases so 
that the impact on output tends to be less than one for 
one and tends to diminish over time. Some estimates, 
however, suggest multipliers higher than the range esti-
mated by CBO. Multipliers for tax cuts are generally 
estimated to be higher than those for spending and to 
grow over time.7 
One pitfall of this approach is that the direction of causa-
tion between policies and the economy is not always 
clear. For example, poor economic conditions can 
prompt the government to enact policies such as those in 
ARRA in an effort to boost economic activity. If weak 
economic performance led to such a policy, it would not 
be accurate to ascribe that performance to the policy, 
rather than vice versa. Likewise, if states and localities 
reduced purchases and laid employees off when their 
budgets deteriorated in a recession, it would not be accu-
rate to blame the recession on the cuts in government 
spending. When causation runs in both directions in this 
way, the historical correlation between variables is not 
always the best guide for predicting the effects of a new 
policy proposal.
One strategy that has been applied to overcome that 
obstacle is to try to isolate the economic impact of spe-
cific policies that are arguably unrelated to economic 
conditions. One such policy is spending during wartime, 
which is driven by national security concerns rather than 
economic conditions.8 However, the effects of additional 
federal spending during wars might not be indicative of 
the effects of increases in federal spending at other times. 
For example, during World War II, the rationing of many 
goods might have reduced the indirect effects of govern-
ment spending on private consumption and investment.9 
Another such policy is federal spending that is allocated 
across states on the basis of criteria other than states’ eco-
nomic conditions. Examples include federal outlays for 
the military and grants provided through ARRA.10 How-
ever, using the cross-state variation in federal spending to 
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estimate the effects of that spending on state economies 
misses two potentially important effects: spillovers from 
recipient states to other states (such as shifts in resources 
from other states or increases in demand for output from 
other states) and any crowding out of investment attrib-
utable to nationwide increases in interest rates. 
More generally, most studies based on historical evidence 
estimate the effects of policies under average economic 
conditions. Under current conditions—in which interest 
rates are apt to be less affected than usual by expansionary 
government policies and in which there are large amounts 
of idle resources—the effects would probably be greater 
than they were, on average, in the past.11 
A recent survey of studies based on historical evidence 
shows that estimates of fiscal multipliers range from 
-0.3 to 3.6, although most of the estimates fall between 
0.5 and 2.0. Several of those studies yield estimates that 
average between 0.5 and 1.0 over a long historical period. 
However, those studies do not specifically provide esti-
mates for a period in which unemployment is high and 
interest rates are very low, as is true for the current 
period.
1. For critical reviews of approaches to measuring fiscal multipliers, 
see Valerie A. Ramey, “Can Government Purchases Stimulate 
the Economy?” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 3 
(September 2011), pp. 673–685; John B. Taylor, “An Empirical 
Analysis of the Revival of Fiscal Activism in the 2000s,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 3 (September 2011), pp. 686–
702; and Jonathan A. Parker, “On Measuring the Effects of Fiscal 
Policy in Recessions,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, 
no. 3 (September 2011), pp. 703–718.
2. The FRB-US model differs from the other two forecasting models 
in that it explicitly incorporates the influence of expected future 
developments on current outcomes.
3. Stimulative policies such as ARRA can lead to higher interest rates 
in two ways. First, if they increase economic activity, they can 
prompt the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to combat infla-
tion. However, that effect has been smaller than usual during the 
past two years and is likely to remain so in the near term. The fed-
eral funds rate (the interest rate directly controlled by the Federal 
Reserve) has been near zero since late 2008 and is unlikely to be 
increased significantly until economic conditions improve sub-
stantially. Interest rates on short-term government securities, 
which tend to move closely with the federal funds rate, also are 
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expansionary government policies are likely to have less effect on 
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inflation-adjusted interest rates or higher inflation in the future. In 
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return on capital and higher interest rates). However, the policies 
in ARRA are temporary and thus are unlikely by themselves to 
have a large impact on the interest rates that people expect beyond 
the next few years.
4. CBO estimates that as the recovery progresses, the Federal Reserve 
will see less need to provide monetary stimulus. Under CBO’s cur-
rent macroeconomic forecast, beginning in mid-2014 the Federal 
Reserve will gradually begin to offset fiscal policy actions by rais-
ing interest rates (or engaging in other actions to tighten monetary 
policy) to reduce the risk of excessive inflation in later years.
5. An International Monetary Fund review of the estimates of seven 
models illustrates the importance of the assumed interest rate 
response in this type of model. See Günter Coenen and others, 
“Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models,” American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 4, no. 1 (January 2012), 
pp. 22–68. For other examples of model estimates that incorpo-
rate a lower-than-usual response of interest rates to policy changes, 
see Michael Woodford, “Simple Analytics of the Government 
Expenditure Multiplier,” American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, vol. 3, no. 1 (January 2011), pp. 1–35; Robert E. Hall, 
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Output?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2 (Fall 2009), 
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Large?” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 119, no. 1 (February 
2011), pp. 78–121; and Troy Davig and Eric M. Leeper, 
Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions and Fiscal Stimulus, Working 
Paper 15133 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
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Monetary Policy,” Economic Modelling, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 
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Luca Sessa, “The General Equilibrium Effects of Fiscal Policy: 
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